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Abstract 
Recently, it has been argued that trend inflation may be the solution to the puzzle of 
inflation persistence in the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC). However, 
incorporating trend inflation into the NKPC raises another serious problem—it lacks a 
microfoundation. The paper presents a microfoundation for trend inflation, which 
indicates that trend inflation is a natural consequence of simultaneous optimization by 
the government and households. A purely forward-looking model is constructed based 
on the microfoundation presented. The model enables a unified explanation for various 
types of inflation. It also indicates that, if inflation is assumed to follow an 
autoregressive process without considering trend inflation, many measures of inflation 
persistence will spuriously indicate that inflation is intrinsically substantially persistent 
and has a backward-looking property. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
     A well-known and serious problem with the pure New Keynesian Phillips curve 
(NKPC) is that it is not consistent with the observed substantial persistence of inflation 
(e.g., Fuhrer and Moore 1995; Galí and Gertler 1999; Mankiw 2001). Therefore, since 
Galí and Gertler (1999), economists have intensely studied a modified version of the 
NKPC (i.e., the hybrid NKPC) that includes lagged inflation. The hybrid NKPC 
captures the persistent nature of inflation well, but the difficult puzzle of why rational 
agents behave in a partially backward-looking manner remains. Galí et al. (2005) argue 
that a more coherent rationale for the role of lagged inflation in the hybrid NKPC must 
be provided. Furthermore, Fuhrer (2006) concludes that inflation in the hybrid NKPC 
inherits relatively little persistence from the driving process and that a microfounded 
mechanism that generates substantial intrinsic persistence in inflation is required. 
     Recently, it has been argued that the appearance of substantial intrinsic inflation 
persistence is spurious due to trend inflation. Cogley and Sbordone (2005, 2006) show 
that, if trend inflation is incorporated into the pure NKPC, its performance on fitting 
actual inflation data improves considerably. They conclude that trend inflation has 
historically been quite volatile and that, if these fluctuations of long-run moving trend 
inflation are taken into account, a purely forward-looking model does a good job 
approximating the short-run dynamics of inflation. Woodford (2007) argues that Cogley 
and Sbordone (2005) present an alternative interpretation of the apparent need for 
lagged inflation terms in the NKPC (see also Hornstein 2007). Indeed, data from most 
industrial economies show that inflation is highly volatile and transitioned from high to 
low in the 1980s, which strongly implies the existence of trends in inflation (e.g., Stock 
and Watson 2006; Sbordone 2007). Ascari (2004) argues that disregarding trend 
inflation is very far from being an innocuous assumption and the results obtained by 
models log-linearized around a zero inflation steady state are misleading (see also 
Bakhshi et al. 2003). These studies suggest that incorporating trend inflation into the 
NKPC will solve the puzzle of inflation persistence. But, if we proceed further in this 
research direction, another serious theoretical problem arises—trend inflation lacks a 
microfoundation. Can trend inflation be explained as a consequence of rational agents’ 
optimizations? Why do monetary policy makers often allow upward trends in inflation? 
The purpose of the paper is to explore the as yet unexplained microfoundation of trend 
inflation, which if discovered, will help provide a solution to the puzzle of inflation 
persistence in the NKPC. 
     An important feature of trend inflation is that it occasionally deviates markedly 
from zero inflation (e.g., hyperinflation or chronic inflation). Such deviations are 
puzzling in the NKPC because the NKPC implies that inflation stays at about a zero 
steady state rate. Data during the Great Inflation in the 1970s particularly perplex NKPC 
researchers. These deviations from zero inflation are not only inconsistent with the 
NKPC but also with the central banks’ expected role to stabilize inflation at a low rate. 
Central banks sometimes look as if they are deliberately allowing continuous high rates 
of inflation perhaps as a result of government intervention. One of the few explanations 
for this behavior is to assume that governments are weak, foolish, or untruthful, and 
they behave irrationally from an economic point of view or are somehow forced to 
behave irrationally. A government may be pressured by interest groups to take an 
inflationary policy stance and intervene in a central bank’s decision-making, and the 
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central bank is then unable to fully commit to its policies, which generates the 
possibility of chronic inflation (e.g., Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro and Gordon 
1983; Rogoff 1985; Berger et al. 2000). The assumptions of ad hoc frictions or that 
households or firms are irrational to some extent have been used to explain 
hyperinflation (e.g., Cagan 1956). For example, hyperinflation can occur only if 
adaptive expectations or some ad hoc frictions are assumed when large budget deficits 
are allowed in the well-known Cagan (1956) framework (e.g., Auernheimer 1976; 
Evans and Yarrow 1981; Kiguel 1989). However, these explanations raise many 
fundamental questions. Is a government always so foolish that it obeys interest groups 
that represent only a part of its constituency? Why is a government so weak even 
though it wields great authority at will? Does a government dare to take inflationary 
actions even if the majority of its constituency prefers low inflation and the government 
itself also desires low inflation? Why do households form adaptive expectations? Is the 
friction used in a Cagan-type hyperinflation model well microfounded? Given these 
unanswered questions, neither of the aforementioned explanations is particularly 
compelling.  
     The fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) argues that a problem with 
conventional inflation theory is that it almost neglects the importance of the 
government’s borrowing behavior in inflation dynamics (e.g., Leeper 1991; Sims 1994, 
1998, 2001; Woodford 1995, 2001; Cochrane 1998a, 1998b, 2005).1 It has been argued 
that, if a government borrows money without limits, inflation will eventually explode 
(e.g., Sargent and Wallace 1981). The FTPL implies that, if a government’s borrowing 
behavior is modeled properly, the mechanism of severely deviated inflation paths can be 
explained without assuming ad hoc frictions or irrationality. Most FTPL models have 
not, however, explicitly modeled the behavior of government in detail. Hence, some 
critics contend that the theory is fallacious (e.g., Kocherlakota and Phelan 1999; 
McCallum 2001, 2003; Buiter 2002, 2004; Niepelt 2004). 
     If, however, the government’s borrowing behavior is modeled properly and 
explicitly, it would be possible to use the FTPL to explain the puzzling behavior of 
central banks and then present a microfoundation of trend inflation. I explore this 
possibility by first examining the nature of the government budget constraint in detail 
and then constructing a model of trend inflation that fully incorporates the government’s 
borrowing behavior. In the model, (1) both the government and the representative 
household achieve simultaneous optimization, (2) the roles of the government and the 
central bank are explicitly separated, and (3) no ad hoc friction or irrationality is 
assumed. The first feature leads to the microfoundation of trend inflation.  
     The model indicates that trend inflation accelerates or decelerates if the time 
preference rates of the government and the representative household are heterogeneous. 
Because a government represents the median of households under a proportional 
representation system and the economically representative household represents the 
mean of households, the preferences between them are usually heterogeneous. In 
addition, and more importantly, even if a government behaves in a fully rational manner 
and understands that heterogeneous time preferences may cause high inflation, the 
government can barely control its own preferences by itself. The government, however, 
is not the only entity that cannot easily self-regulate its own preferences at will, even 
                                                          
1 See also Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000), Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000), and Gordon and Leeper (2002). 
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when these preferences may result in unfavorable consequences. Hence, an independent 
central bank is necessary to control the government’s preferences and prevent this 
inflation acceleration mechanism from working.  
     If trend inflation is truly generated by the mechanism shown in the paper, studies 
that do not appropriately account for trend inflation will provide misleading conclusions. 
The model in the paper indicates that, if inflation is assumed to be an autoregressive 
process, many measures of persistence will spuriously show that inflation is 
substantially persistent, implying that findings of substantial intrinsic inflation 
persistence is a consequence of serious misspecification. The model thus will provide an 
essential clue to solve the puzzle of inflation persistence. Furthermore, the model 
enables a unified and microfounded explanation for various inflation phenomena (e.g., 
hyperinflation, chronic inflation, disinflation, low and stable inflation, and deflation) 
without assuming ad hoc frictions or irrationality. 
     The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I examine the nature of the 
government budget constraint and construct a model of trend inflation that assumes an 
economically Leviathan government in which the government and the representative 
household achieve simultaneous optimization. With this microfoundation of trend 
inflation, a model of inflation is constructed in which all the agents behave in purely 
forward-looking manners. In section 3, the basic nature of the model is examined. The 
model indicates that various types of inflation are generated according to the degree of 
central bank independence and the difference of preferences between government and 
households. In section 4, I show that, if inflation is assumed to follow an autoregressive 
process without considering trend inflation, many measures of inflation persistence will 
spuriously indicate that inflation is intrinsically substantially persistent. Finally, I offer 
concluding remarks in section 5. 
 
2  THE MODEL 
 
2.1  Step 1: Optimal trend inflation2 
2.1.1  The government 
2.1.1.1  The government budget constraint 
     As with the FTPL, the government budget constraint is a key element in the 
explanation for inflation in this paper. The budget constraint is 
 
tttttt ΩXGiBB −−+=& , 
 
where Bt is the nominal obligation of the government to pay for its accumulated bonds, 
it is the nominal interest rate for government bonds, Gt is the nominal government 
expenditure, Xt is the nominal tax revenue, and tΩ  is the nominal amount of 
seigniorage at time t. The tax is assumed to be lump sum, the government bonds are 
long term, and the returns on the bonds are realized only after the bonds are held during 
a unit period (e.g., a year). The government bonds are redeemed in a unit period, and the 
                                                          
2 The model of the optimal trend inflation in section 2 is based on the inflation model presented in 
Harashima (2007c). Various aspects of the model and analyses in this paper are also presented in 
Harashima (2004b, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b). 
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government successively refinances the bonds by issuing new ones at each time t. Let 
t
t
t P
Bb = , 
t
t
t P
Gg = , 
t
t
t P
Xx = , and 
t
t
t P
Ω
ω = , where Pt is the price level at time t. Let also 
t
t
t P
P
π
&=  be the inflation rate at time t. By dividing by Pt, the budget constraint is 
transformed to ttttt
t
t ωxgib
P
B −−+=& , which is equivalent to 
 
tttttttt πbωxgibb −−−+=& ( ) tttttt ωxgπib −−+−= . 
 
     Because the returns on government bonds are realized only after holding the 
bonds during a unit period, investors buy the bonds if ( )dsrπEi t
t tstt ∫ + +≥ 1  at time t, 
where ti  is the nominal interest rate for bonds bought at t and rt is the real interest rate 
in markets at t. Hence, by arbitrage, ( )dsrπEi t
t tstt ∫ + += 1 , and if rt is constant such that 
rrt =  (i.e., if it is at steady state), then 
 
rdsπEi
t
t stt
+= ∫ +1 . 
 
The nominal interest rate rdsπEi
t
t stt
+= ∫ +1  means that, during a sufficiently small 
period between t and t + dt, the government’s obligation to pay for the bonds’ return in 
the future increases not by ( )rπdt t +  but by ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ +∫ + rdsπEdt tt st 1 . If πt is constant, then 
t
t
t st
πdsπE =∫ +1  and rπi tt += , but if πt is not constant, these equations do not 
necessarily hold. 
     Since bonds are redeemed in a unit period and successively refinanced, the bonds 
the government is holding at t have been issued between 1−t  and t. Hence, under 
perfect foresight, the average nominal interest rate for all government bonds at time t is 
the weighted sum of ti  such that 
 
=
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
= ∫ ∫− −
ds
dvB
B
ii
t
t t
t tv
ts
st 1
1 ,
, rds
dvB
B
dvπ
t
t t
t tv
tss
s v
+
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∫ ∫∫− −
+
1
1 ,
,1 , 
 
where tsB ,  is the nominal value of bonds at time t that were issued at time s. If the 
weights 
∫ −tt tv
ts
dvB
B
1 ,
,  between 1−t  and t are not so different from each other, then 
approximately rdsdvπi
t
t
s
s vt
+= ∫ ∫− +1 1 . To be precise, if the absolute values of sπ  for 
11 +≤<− tst  are sufficiently smaller than unity, the differences among the weights are 
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negligible and then approximately 
 
rdsdvπi
t
t
s
s vt
+= ∫ ∫− +1 1                       (1) 
 
(see Appendix 1).3 The average nominal interest rate for the total government bonds, 
therefore, develops by rdsdvπi
t
t
s
s vt
+= ∫ ∫− +1 1 . If tπ  is constant, then 
t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπ =∫ ∫− +1 1 ; thus, rπi tt += . If tπ  is not constant, however, the equations 
t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπ =∫ ∫− +1 1  and rπi tt +=  do not necessarily hold.  
 
2.1.1.2  An economically Leviathan government  
     Under a proportional representation system, the government represents the 
median household whereas the representative household from an economic perspective 
represents the mean household.4 Because of this difference, they usually have different 
preferences. To account for this essential difference, a Leviathan government is 
assumed in the model. 5  There are two extremely different views regarding 
government’s behavior in the literature on political economy: the Leviathan view and 
the benevolent view (e.g., Downs 1957; Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Alesina and 
Cukierman 1990). From an economic point of view, a benevolent government 
maximizes the expected economic utility of the representative household, but a 
Leviathan government does not. Whereas the expenditure of a benevolent government is 
a tool used to maximize the economic utility of the representative household, the 
expenditure of a Leviathan government is a tool used to achieve the government’s own 
policy objectives.6 For example, if a Leviathan government considers national security 
to be the most important political issue, defense spending will increase greatly, but if 
improving social welfare is the top political priority, spending on social welfare will 
increase dramatically, even though the increased expenditures may not necessarily 
increase the economic utility of the representative household. 
     Is it possible, however, for such a Leviathan government to hold office for a long 
period? Yes, because a government is generally chosen by the median household under 
                                                          
3 If the absolute values of sπ  for 11 +≤<− tst   are very large, the weight ∫ −tt tv
tt
dvB
B
1 ,
,  will be 
much larger than 
∫ −
−
t
t tv
tt
dvB
B
1 ,
,1  when πt is increasing. In this case, ti  will be closer to rdsπ
t
t s
+∫ +1  
than  rdsdvπ
t
t
s
s v
+∫ ∫− +1 1 . 
4 See the literature on the median voter theorem (e.g., Downs 1957). Also see the literature on the delay 
in reforms (e.g., Alesina and Drazen 1991; Cukierman et al. 1992). 
5 The most prominent reference to Leviathan governments is Brennan and Buchanan (1980). 
6 The government behavior assumed in the FTPL reflects an aspect of a Leviathan government. 
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) argue that non-Ricardian policies correspond to the type of policies in 
which governments are viewed as selecting policies and committing themselves to those policies in 
advance of prices being determined in markets. 
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a proportional representation system (e.g., Downs 1957) whereas the representative 
household usually presumed in the economics literature is the mean household. The 
economically representative household is not usually identical to the politically 
representative household, and a majority of people could support a Leviathan 
government even if they know that the government does not necessarily pursue only the 
economic objectives of the economically representative household. In other words, the 
Leviathan government argued here is an economically Leviathan government that 
maximizes the political utility of people, whereas the conventional economically 
benevolent government maximizes the economic utility of people. In addition, because 
the politically and economically representative households are different (the median and 
mean households, respectively), the preferences of future governments will also be 
similarly different from those of the mean representative household. In this sense, the 
current and future governments presented in the model can be seen as a combined 
government that goes on indefinitely; that is, the economically Leviathan government 
always represents the median representative household. 
     The Leviathan view generally requires the explicit inclusion of government 
expenditure, tax revenue, or related activities in the government’s political utility 
function (e.g., Edwards and Keen 1996). Because an economically Leviathan 
government derives political utility from expenditure for its political purposes, the 
larger the expenditure is, the happier the Leviathan government will be. But raising tax 
rates will provoke people’s antipathy, which increases the probability of being replaced 
by the opposing party that also nearly represents the median household. Thus, the 
economically Leviathan government regards taxes as necessary costs to obtain freedom 
of expenditure for its own purposes. The government therefore will derive utility from 
expenditure and disutility from taxes. Expenditure and taxes in the political utility 
function of the government are analogous to consumption and labor hours in the 
economic utility function of the representative household. Consumption and labor hours 
are both control variables, and as such, the government’s expenditure and tax revenue 
are also control variables. As a whole, the political utility function of economically 
Leviathan government can be expressed as ( )ttG x,gu .7 In addition, it can be assumed 
on the basis of previously mentioned arguments that 0>∂
∂
t
G
g
u  and 02
2
<∂
∂
t
G
g
u , and 
therefore that 0<∂
∂
t
G
x
u and 02
2
>∂
∂
t
G
x
u .8 An economically Leviathan government 
                                                          
7 It is possible to assume that governments are partially benevolent. In this case, the utility function of a 
government can be assumed to be ( )ttttG l,c,x,gu , where tc is real consumption and tl  is the leisure 
hours of the representative household. However, if a lump-sum tax is imposed, the government’s policies 
do not affect steady-state consumption and leisure hours. In this case, the utility function can be assumed 
to be ( )ttG x,gu . 
8 Some may argue that it is more likely that 0>∂
∂
t
G
x
u and 02
2
<∂
∂
t
G
x
u . However, the assumption used 
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therefore maximizes the expected sum of these utilities discounted by its time 
preference rate under the constraint of deficit financing. 
 
2.1.1.3  The optimization problem 
     The optimization problem of an economically Leviathan government is  
 
( ) ( )dttθ,xguEMax GttG −∫ ∞ exp00  
 
subject to the budget constraint 
 
( ) ttttttt ωxgπibb −−+−=& , 
 
where Gu  is the constant relative risk aversion utility function of the government and 
Gθ  is the government’s rate of time preference. All variables are expressed in per capita 
terms, and population is assumed to be constant. The government maximizes its 
expected political utility considering the behavior of the economically representative 
household that is reflected in it in its budget constraint. 
 
2.1.2  Households 
     The economically representative household maximizes its expected economic 
utility. Sidrauski (1967)’s well-known money in the utility function model is used for 
the optimization problem. The representative household maximizes its expected utility 
 
( ) ( )dttθm,cuE PttP −∫ ∞ exp00  
 
subject to the budget constraint 
 ( ) ( )[ ] tttttttttt gmrπcσwara −++−++=& ,9 
 
where Pu  and Pθ  are the utility function and the time preference rate of the 
representative household, ct is real consumption, wt is real wage, tσ  is lump-sum real 
government transfers, mt is real money, ttt mka += , and kt is real capital. It is 
assumed that ( )tt kfr ′= , ( ) ( )tttt kfkkfw ′−= , 0>'uP , 0<"uP , ( ) 0>∂
∂
t
ttP
m
m,cu , and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
is not an important issue here because 
( )
( ) 0
2
2
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
x
x
x
,xgu
x
,xgux &  at steady state, as will be shown in the 
solution to the optimization problem later in the paper. Thus, the results are not affected by which 
assumption is used.  
9 The constraint is equivalent to ( ) ( )[ ] ( )ttttttttttttttt πibωxbmrπcσwara −+−−−++−++= && . 
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( ) 02
2
<∂
∂
t
ttP
m
m,cu , where ( )⋅f  is the production function. Government expenditure (gt) is 
an exogenous variable for the representative household because of the assumption of an 
economically Leviathan government. It is also assumed that lump-sum government 
transfers ( tσ ) equal the seigniorage (st), and that, although all households receive 
transfers from a government in equilibrium, each household takes the amount it receives 
as given when making decisions, independent of its money holdings. Thus, the budget 
constraint means that the real output ( )tkf  at any time is demanded for the real 
consumption ct, the real investment tk& , and the real government expenditure gt such 
that ( ) tttt gkckf ++= & . The representative household maximizes its expected economic 
utility considering the behavior of government reflected in gt in the budget constraint. In 
this discussion, a central bank is not assumed to be independent of the government; thus, 
the functions of the government and the central bank are not separated. This assumption 
can be relaxed, and the roles of the government and the central bank are explicitly 
separated in section 2.2. 
     Note that the time preference rate of government ( Gθ ) is not necessarily identical 
to that of the representative household ( Pθ ) because the government and the 
representative household represent different households (i.e., the median and mean 
households, respectively). In addition, the preferences will differ because (1) even 
though people want to choose a government that has the same time preference rate as 
the representative household, the rates may differ owing to errors in expectations (e.g., 
Alesina and Cukierman 1990); and (2) current voters cannot bind the choices of future 
voters and, if current voters are aware of this possibility, they may vote more 
myopically as compared with their own rates of impatience in private economic 
activities (e.g., Tabellini and Alesina 1990). Hence, it is highly likely that the time 
preference rates of a government and the representative household are heterogeneous. It 
should be also noted, however, that even though the rates of time preference are 
heterogeneous, an economically Leviathan government behaves based only on its own 
time preference rate, without hesitation. 
 
2.1.3  The simultaneous optimization 
     First, I examine the optimization problem of the representative household. Let 
Hamiltonian PH  be ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ttttttttttP,PttPP gmrπcσwarλtθm,cuH −+−−+++−= exp , 
where tP,λ  is a costate variable, ct and mt are control variables, and at is a state variable. 
The optimality conditions for the representative household are:  
 ( ) ( ) tP,P
t
ttP λtθ
c
m,cu =−∂
∂ exp ,                     (2) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )tttP,P
t
ttP rπλtθ
m
m,cu +=−∂
∂ exp ,                   (3) 
 
ttP,tP, rλλ −=& ,                            (4) 
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 ( ) ( )[ ]ttttttttt gmrπcσwraa −++−++=& ,               (5) 
 
0lim =∞→ ttP,t aλ .                          (6) 
 
By conditions (2) and (3), 
( )
( ) tt
t
ttP
t
ttP
rπ
c
m,cu
m
m,cu
+=
∂
∂
∂
∂
, and by conditions (2) and (4), 
( )
( ) tP
t
t
t
ttP
t
ttP
t
rθ
c
c
c
m,cu
c
m,cuc
=+
∂
∂
∂
∂
− &
2
2
. Hence, 
 
rrθ tP ==                              (7) 
 
at steady state such that 0=tc&  and 0=tk& . 
     Next, I examine the optimization problem of the economically Leviathan 
government. Let Hamiltonian GH  be ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tttttttG,GttGG ωxgπibλtθx,guH −−+−+−= exp , 
where tG,λ  is a costate variable. The optimality conditions for the government are:  
 ( ) ( ) tG,G
t
ttG λtθ
g
x,gu −=−∂
∂ exp ,                     (8) 
 ( ) ( ) tG,G
t
ttG λtθ
x
x,gu =−∂
∂ exp ,                      (9) 
 
 ( )tttG,tG, πiλλ −−=& ,                        (10) 
 
( ) ttttttt ωxgπibb −−+−=& ,                     (11) 
 
0lim =∞→ ttG,t bλ .                         (12) 
 
Combining conditions (8), (9), and (10) and equation (1) yields the following equations: 
( )
( ) t
t
t
s
s vtttG
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
πdsdvπrπiθ
g
g
g
x,gu
g
x,gug
−+=−=+
∂
∂
∂
∂
∫ ∫− +1 1
2
2
&  and 
( )
( ) =−=+
∂
∂
∂
∂
− ttG
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
πiθ
x
x
x
x,gu
x
x,gux &2
2
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t
t
t
s
s vt
πdsdvπr −+ ∫ ∫− +1 1 . Here, 
( )
( ) 0
2
2
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
g
g
g
x,gu
g
x,gug &  and 
( )
( ) 0
2
2
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
x
x
x
x,gu
x
x,gux &  at 
steady state such that 0=tg&  and 0=tx& ; thus, 
 
t
t
t
s
s vtG
πdsdvπrθ −+= ∫ ∫− +1 1 . 
 
Hence, by equation (7), 
 
PGt
t
t
s
s v
θθπdsdvπ −+=∫ ∫− +1 1                     (13) 
 
at steady state such that 0=tg& , 0=tx& , 0=tc& , and 0=tk& .10   
     Equation (13) is a natural consequence of simultaneous optimization by the 
economically Leviathan government and the representative household. If the rates of 
time preference are heterogeneous between them, then 
 
t
t
t
s
s vt
πdsdvπri ≠=− ∫ ∫− +1 1 .11 
 
This result might seem surprising because it has been naturally believed that rπi tt +=  
and then dsdvππ
t
t
s
s vt ∫ ∫− += 1 1  by equation (1). However, this is a simple 
misunderstanding because tπ  indicates the instantaneous rate of inflation at a point 
such that 
t
t
t P
P
π
&= , whereas dsdvπt
t
s
s v∫ ∫− +1 1  roughly indicates the average inflation 
rate in a period. Equation (13) indicates that tπ  develops according to the integral 
equation PG
t
t
s
s vt
θθdsdvππ +−= ∫ ∫− +1 1 . If tπ  is constant, the equations rπi tt +=  and 
dsdvππ
t
t
s
s vt ∫ ∫− += 1 1  are true. However, if tπ  is not constant, the equations do not 
necessarily hold. Equation (13) indicates that the equations rπi tt +=  and 
dsdvππ
t
t
s
s vt ∫ ∫− += 1 1  hold only in the case where PG θθ =  (i.e., a homogeneous rate of 
time preference). It has been previously thought that a homogeneous rate of time 
preference naturally prevails; thus, the equation rπi tt +=  has not been questioned. As 
argued previously, however, a homogeneous rate of time preference is not usually 
                                                          
10  If and only if 
t
ttt
G b
ωxg
θ
−−−=  at steady state, then the transversality condition (12) 
0lim =∞→ ttG,t bλ  holds. The proof is shown in Appendix 2. 
11 Note that dsdvπri
t
t
s
s vt ∫ ∫− +=− 1 1  as equation (1) shows.  
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guaranteed. 
 
2.1.4  The law of motion for trend inflation 
     Equation (13) indicates that inflation accelerates or decelerates as a result of the 
government and the representative household reconciling the contradiction in 
heterogeneous rates of time preference. If tπ  is constant, the equation 
dsdvππ
t
t
s
s vt ∫ ∫− += 1 1  holds; conversely, if dsdvππ tt ss vt ∫ ∫− +≠ 1 1 , then tπ  is not 
constant. Without the acceleration or deceleration of inflation, therefore, equation (13) 
cannot hold in an economy in which PG θθ ≠ . In other words, it is not until PG θθ ≠  
that inflation can accelerate or decelerate. Heterogeneous time preferences ( PG θθ ≠ ) 
change the path of inflation and enable inflation to accelerate or decelerate.  
     Equation (13) implies that inflation accelerates or decelerates nonlinearly when 
PG θθ ≠ . For a sufficiently small period dt, dttπ ++1  is determined with the 
sπ ( )11 +≤<− tst  that satisfies ttt ss v πdsdvπ −∫ ∫− +1 1 PG θθ −= , so as to hold the equation 
dsdvπ
dtt
t
s
s v∫ ∫+ +1 tdttdttt ss v ππdsdvπ −+= ++−− +∫ ∫11 1 . A solution of the integral equation 
(13) for given Gθ  and Pθ  is 
 ( ) 20 6 tθθππ PGt −+= .                       (14) 
 
Generally, the path of inflation that satisfies equation (13) for t≤0  is expressed as 
 ( ) ( )[ ]tzθθππ tPGt lnexp60 −+= ,                  (15) 
 
where zt is a time-dependent variable. The stream of tz  varies depending on the 
boundary condition, that is, past and present inflation during 01 ≤<− t  and the path of 
inflation during 10 ≤< t , that is set to make 0π  satisfy equation (13). However, tz  has 
the following important property: if tπ  satisfies equation (13) for t≤0 , and 
∞<<∞− tπ  for 11 ≤<− t , then  
 
2lim =∞→ tt z .                           (16) 
 
The proof is shown in Appendix 3. Therefore, any inflation path that satisfies equation 
(13) for t≤0  asymptotically approaches the path of equation (14). 
 
2.1.5  The inflation acceleration (deceleration) mechanism  
     Because the integral equation (13) is so different from what has been regarded as 
the common wisdom (i.e., rπi tt += ), some researchers may still be skeptical of the 
result. Equation (13), however, is a very natural consequence of simultaneous 
optimization. Rather, it would appear more surprising if heterogeneous and 
homogeneous preferences produced identical results. The basic mechanism behind 
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equation (13) is that when inflation accelerates, the increase rate of the government’s 
real obligation bt at time t is not r but t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπr −+ ∫ ∫− +1 1  because increases in 
the real obligation are moved forward in time (or “moved up”) by the acceleration of 
inflation. In this section, I explain this mechanism in more detail.  
 
2.1.5.1  Necessity of reconciling heterogeneous discount factors  
     In the non-stochastic economy modeled in section 2.1 (Step 1), the sum of the 
government’s real expenditure, the representative household’s real consumption, and 
the real investment is equal to the real output at any time, as shown in the budget 
constraint of the representative household, such that 
 
( ) tttt gkckf ++= & . 
 
Hence, the streams of expenditure and consumption are not determined independently 
of each other and should be consistent with the stream of the output. However, if the 
discount factors ( Gθ  and Pθ ) are heterogeneous, there is no guarantee that the streams 
are consistent; that is, there is no guarantee that both transversality conditions of the 
government and the representative household (equations [6] and [12]) are satisfied and 
that both expected utilities are maximized simultaneously. For example, the expected 
utility of the representative household is maximized if the point Pθr =  is at steady state 
as usual and as equation (7) shows. However, if PG θθ ≠ , it is not rational for the 
government to stop changing its real expenditures, taxes, and borrowing at the point 
where Pθr = . The government’s expected utility will increase by changing them even if 
Pθr =  because GP θθr ≠= . The government’s behavior obstructs the optimization of 
the representative household, but it is completely rational behavior for the government. 
Therefore, this contradiction of discount factors should be reconciled by some 
mechanism to make the streams consistent (except for corner solutions) and to make 
both the government and the representative household able to achieve simultaneous 
optimization.  
     The easiest way to achieve a steady state in an economy when discount factors are 
heterogeneous is to expel the government from the market, but that is impossible. 
Unless a way is found that enables the government and the representative household to 
coexist at steady states (other than corner solutions), the economy may break down. For 
them to be able to coexist at steady states, the government should stop changing its real 
borrowing at the point where GP θθr ≠= . Hence, if there is a mechanism that penalizes 
the government for having Gθ  unequal to Pθ  and makes it refrain from changing its 
real borrowing at the point where GP θθr ≠= , coexistence will be possible. Equation 
(15) indicates that the mechanism for penalizing the government does indeed exist—the 
acceleration or deceleration of inflation. I explain how this mechanism works in the next 
section. 
 
2.1.5.2  Moved-up real obligations  
     Suppose for simplicity that PG θθ > . Inflation accelerates by equations (15) and 
(16) because of the heterogeneous discount factors. Equation (13) indicates that the 
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government’s existing real obligation bt increases at a higher rate than r by 
( )0
1
1 >−∫ ∫− + ttt ss v πdsdvπ  because dsdvπri tt ss vt ∫ ∫− ++= 1 1  as equation (1) indicates 
and the real obligation increases by 
 
( ) =−−+−= ttttttt ωxgπibb& tttttt ss vt ωxgπdsdvπrb −−+⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −+ ∫ ∫− +1 1  
 
as shown in the real government budget constraint. This higher rate of increase in the 
real obligation by t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπ −∫ ∫− +1 1 , a result of accelerating inflation, indicates the 
government’s penalty for having PG θθ > . 
     Note, however, that the real rate of return on investments in government bonds is 
always r regardless of the acceleration of inflation because 
 
( ) =−∫ + dsπitt st1 rdsπrdsπ tt stt s =−+ ∫∫ ++ 11 . 
 
When inflation accelerates, the increased rate of the government’s real obligation bt at 
time t is not r, however, it is t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπr −+ ∫ ∫− +1 1  because increases in the real 
obligation are moved forward in time (or “moved up”) by the acceleration of inflation. 
Figure 1 shows the increases in the real obligation at each time during a unit period for 
bonds issued at t ( tB ), the real value of which at time t is tb  when inflation is 
accelerating. Because the nominal interest rate dsπri
t
t st ∫ ++= 1  indicates that the 
government’s nominal obligation to pay for the bonds’ return in the future increases at 
the constant rate dsπr
t
t s∫ ++ 1  between t and 1+t , then the real obligation expands at 
a time-varying rate between t and 1+t  such that 
 
v
t
t s
πdsπr −+ ∫ +1  
 
owing to the accelerating rate of inflation (πt). Clearly, the line of the increases in the 
real obligation should slope down to the right as shown in Figure 1. Hence, the rate of 
increase in the real obligation at time t is higher than r. The increases in the real 
obligation are moved up by the acceleration of inflation, holding the total increase in the 
real obligation during a unit period between t and 1+t  to tbr . 
     However, the moved-up increases in the real obligation mean that the increases in 
the real obligation become smaller later in a unit period for each bond. Thus, because 
bonds issued between 1−t  and t offset each other, does the rate of increase in the real 
obligation of total government borrowing remain r at any time? It does not, because the 
magnitude of the increase (i.e., the rate of increase) in moving up increases as inflation 
accelerates (Fig. 2). Because the rate of inflation increases by the square of time as 
shown in equations (14), (15), and (16), more increases in the real obligation are moved 
up as time passes. As a result, the increases in the real obligation cannot be indefinitely 
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offset completely by the smaller increases in the real obligation of bonds issued in the 
past. Figure 3 shows the increases in the real obligation of bonds issued between 1−t  
and t at time t (i.e., the increases in the real obligation of tstB ,1+−  for 10 ≤< s , the real 
value of which at time t is tstb ,1+− ). Here, tstb ,1+−  is constant at steady state, b . Hence, 
the increases in the real obligation of the total government bonds at time t is br  plus 
the area of triangle ABC minus the area of triangle CDE in Figure 3. The area of 
triangle ABC is larger than the area of triangle CDE because the magnitude of moving 
up increases as time passes. Thus, the rate of increase in real obligation of the total 
government borrowing at time t (i.e., s
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπr −+ ∫ ∫− +1 1 ) is larger than r for any 
future t indefinitely. The government therefore must continue to face rates of increase in 
real obligation higher than r by 
 
t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπ −∫ ∫− +1 1  
 
at all points in the future.  
 
2.1.5.3  Optimal behaviors of the government and the representative household 
     The government optimally plans its streams of future real expenditures, taxes, and 
borrowings subject to this moved up higher rate of increase in the real obligation for a 
future t. The government stops changing its real expenditures, taxes, and borrowing if 
the rate of increase in the real obligation t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπr −+ ∫ ∫− +1 1  equals the 
government’s time preference rate Gθ . The rate at which the real obligation increases is 
therefore a crucial variable in determining the government’s behavior. As equations (7) 
and (13) show, equations 
 
rθP =  
 
and 
 
=Gθ t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπr −+ ∫ ∫− +1 1  
 
hold simultaneously at steady state. That is, both the government and the representative 
household can achieve simultaneous optimization. In this sense, the rate at which the 
real obligation increases is a crucial variable not only for the government but for the 
entire economy. 
     The mechanism by which the government stops changing its real borrowing at the 
point where GP θθr ≠=  implies that the government is penalized if it has a higher time 
preference rate than the representative household. The penalized government is obliged 
to refrain from changing its real borrowing at the point rθP =  facing =Gθ  
t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπr −+ ∫ ∫− +1 1 . Therefore, with the penalty 
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t
t
t
s
s v
πdsdvπ −∫ ∫− +1 1 , 
 
the contradiction of discount factors between the government and the representative 
household is reconciled. The government is penalized by the representative household 
by its expectation of accelerating inflation so as to prevent the economy from breaking 
down.  
     Determining behavior on the basis of the rate at which the real obligation 
increases, as equation (13) indicates, is optimal for the government as well as for the 
representative household. This is still true even if it is assumed that a government can 
perceive less moved-up real obligations (i.e., perceive less penalty) in the sense of a less 
steep slope in Figure 1 (i.e., the government can behave on the basis of a lower it than 
equations [1] and [13] indicate). This is true because, if such a government seeks to 
exploit the opportunity of higher expected utility by intentionally perceiving a lower 
rate of increase in the real obligation, then Gθ  is always higher than the rate of increase 
in the real obligation. Therefore, the representative household cannot achieve optimality 
at the point where Pθr = . To prevent this consequence, the representative household 
penalizes the government more heavily by expecting more rapid inflation acceleration 
than equation (13) shows and makes the rate of increase in the real obligation the 
government perceives identical to Gθ . Note here that equations (13) and (15) concern 
only price level changes and are unrelated to real values, and real values are thus 
unaffected as long as the rate of increase in the real obligation the government perceives 
is identical to Gθ , irrespective of how the values of it and the penalty are perceived by 
the government. Hence, the government cannot achieve the higher expected utility by 
intentionally perceiving less moved-up real obligations, which will only result in a more 
rapid acceleration of inflation. Conversely, if the representative household penalizes the 
government more heavily than equation (13) shows to exploit the opportunity of a 
higher expected utility, then Gθ  is always lower than the rate of increase in the real 
obligation and thereby the government cannot achieve optimality. To prevent this 
consequence, the government changes itself to perceive less moved-up real obligations 
and makes the rate of increase in the real obligation identical to Gθ . Hence, the 
representative household cannot achieve the higher expected utility by penalizing the 
government more heavily, which also only results in more rapid acceleration of inflation. 
As a result, even if it is assumed that a government can perceive less moved-up real 
obligations, in the sense of a less steep slope in Figure 1, equation (13) gives both the 
government and the representative household the least inflation acceleration for the 
highest expected utilities. In this sense, the strategy profile that both the government and 
the representative household do not seek to exploit these opportunities is a Nash 
equilibrium. Both know this mechanism well and expect inflation to accelerate as 
equation (13) indicates when they perceive that PG θθ > . 
 
2.2  Step 2: Elements in the model 
     In Step 1, it was shown that a trend exists in inflation as a consequence of 
simultaneous optimization with heterogeneous time preference rates. However, merely 
showing the existence of the optimal trend inflation is not sufficient to state that trend 
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inflation is microfounded. An important property of trend inflation is that it has been 
historically quite volatile and often breaks (e.g., Cogley and Sbordone 2005, 2006; 
Stock and Watson 2006; Sbordone 2007). To complete a microfoundation of trend 
inflation, therefore, it is necessary to show a mechanism that brings about frequent trend 
breaks. Equations (13) and (15) imply that, if Gθ  and ( )rθP =  are exogenously given 
constants, inflation exactly follows the path of optimal trend inflation and no trend 
break is brought about. Conversely, trend inflation can break if Gθ , ( )rθP = , or both 
are endogenous. In Step 2, I show that Gθ  is endogenous if a central bank is 
independent and then construct an inflation model with an endogenous Gθ  in Step 3 
(Section 2.3). I also examine various elements that may appear in the model in Step 3. 
Many of the variables and equations examined here are basically the same as those in 
conventional discrete-time inflation models, including the aggregate supply equation, 
aggregate demand equation, and the instrument rule for a central bank. Variables and 
equations relating to trend inflation are also examined. 
 
2.2.1  Optimal trend inflation 
     The elements that represent the optimal trend inflation in the model should be 
consistent with equation (15). The discrete-time version of equation (15) is 
 ( ) ( )[ ]φtzθθππ tPGTφTt −−+= lnexp6                  (17) 
 
and equivalently 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ }φtzφtzθθππ ttPGTtTt −−+−−+= ++ lnexp1lnexp6 11 ,      (18) 
 
where Ttπ  is the trend component in inflation in period t and ( )tφ ≤  is the period in 
which the latest shock on Gθ  occurred. In section 2.2.4, I will explain that Gθ  should 
be time-variable and shocks on Gθ  play an important role in inflation dynamics. When 
a shock on Gθ  occurs and the value of Gθ  is changed in period φ , trend inflation 
needs to be adjusted to be consistent with the new value of Gθ  for the new initial 
period φ . The value of zt is determined by the mechanism explained in section 2.1.2. 
Equations (17) and (18) are used in the model as the trend component in inflation. 
 
2.2.2  Aggregate supply equation 
     Because the pure NKPC cannot sufficiently capture the persistent nature of 
inflation, it is necessary to modify the pure NKPC to a variant of the NKPC, such as the 
hybrid NKPC. In addition, the modified NKPC in the model should be consistent with 
optimal trend inflation (equation [17]). Here, as in Yun (1996) and Svensson (2003), 
who allow firms to index prices to the average inflation rate, the following modified 
version of NKPC that incorporates the nature of trend inflation is used: 
 
( )( ) 112211 1 ++++++ ++−−=− tt|txT t|tt|tPTtt εxαππθππ ,             (19) 
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where xt is the output gap; t|tπ 1+ , 
T
t|tπ 1+ , and t|tx 1+  are the rate of inflation, rate of 
trend inflation, and output gaps, respectively, that are expected in period t for period 
1+t ; αx is a constant coefficient; and εt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean. This 
trend-augmented NKPC is basically the same as the simple forward-looking model in 
Svensson (2003); it merely replaces the average inflation rate with the optimal trend 
inflation.12 Current inflation is determined not only by expected future inflation but also 
by trend inflation. By iterating equation (19) forward,        
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
1
1
1111 11lim +
∞
=
+
−
++++∞→++ +−+−−=− ∑ ts ts|tsPxT t|stt|stsPsTtt εxθαππθππ , 
 
and because 110 <−< Pθ  and it is assumed that ( ) ∞<−<∞− ++++∞→ T t|stt|sts ππ 11lim , then 
 
( ) 1
1
1
11 1 +
∞
=
+
−
++ +−+= ∑ t
s
ts|t
s
Px
T
tt εxθαππ ,                (20) 
 
which indicates that inflation is a process that proceeds not around zero inflation but 
around trend inflation. 
     The presence of trend inflation, however, may make the Calvo-type exogenous 
price-setting assumption rather unrealistic (e.g., Ascari 2004; Bakhshi et al. 2007). 
Nevertheless, similar to the model in Yun (1996), if firms fully index their prices to 
trend inflation, it offsets the influence of trend inflation on Calvo price-setting.13 
Although some researchers may still argue that full indexation is unrealistic, it is 
assumed in the present paper for simplicity that firms fully index their prices to trend 
inflation because this indexation is completely different from the backward-looking 
indexation that is assumed for the hybrid HKPC in some papers (e.g., Christiano et al. 
2005). Firms index their prices not to past prices but to the expected optimal trend 
inflation that is formed purely in a forward-looking manner as shown in section 2.1 
(Step 1). Moreover, it is not the main purpose of the present paper to elaborate the 
microfoundation of the Calvo-type NKPC model with trend inflation but to analyze the 
nature of a model with microfounded trend inflation.  
     If Gθ  is an exogenously given constant, then 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]{ }2lnexp11lnexp61 2121 +−−−+−−+=−− ++++ φtzθφtzθθπθπθπ tPtPGTφPT t|tPT t|t
 
by equation (17). Similarly, if Gθ  is a time-dependent endogenous variable (its 
mechanism will be explained in section 2.2.4), then 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]2lnexp161lnexp61 221121 +−−−+−+=−− ++++++ φtzθθφtzθπθπθπ ttG,PttG,TφPT t|tPT |tt  
              ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]{ }2lnexp11lnexp6 21 +−−−+−− ++ φtzθφtzθ tPtP  
 
                                                          
12 It is also similar to the model used in Sbordone (2007).   
13 See, for example, Bakhshi et al. (2007). 
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by equation (17) modified by replacing Gθ  with tGθ , , where tGθ ,  is Gθ  in period t. 
Hence, the aggregate supply equation (19) is transformed to 
 
         ( ) 1121 1 ++++ ++−+= tt|txt|tPTφPt εxαπθπθπ  
   ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]2lnexp161lnexp6 2211 +−−−+−+ ++++ φtzθθφtzθ ttG,PttG,  
   ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]{ }2lnexp11lnexp6 21 +−−−+−− ++ φtzθφtzθ tPtP .           (21) 
 
2.2.3  Aggregate demand equation 
     Similar to Clarida et al. (1999) and Svensson and Woodford (2003), the model 
has the structure of the New Keynesian model with both forward-looking aggregate 
supply and demand equations. The model uses the following forward-looking aggregate 
demand equation: 
 ( ) 12121 +++++ +−−−= tt|tt|trt|tt ηrπiβxx ,                (22) 
 
where it is the nominal interest rate, r is the real interest rate at steady state, βr is a 
constant coefficient, and ηt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean. Note that Pθr =  by 
equation (7). This aggregate demand equation is basically same as the one used in 
Svensson and Woodford (2003), and it is a variant of the one used in Clarida et al. 
(1999) and the simple forward-looking one used in Svensson (2003).  
 
2.2.4  The central bank 
     A central bank manipulates the nominal interest rate according to the following 
Taylor-type instrument rule in the model: 
 ( ) tx*tπt xγππγγi +−+= ,                   (23) 
 
where *π  is the target rate of inflation and γ , γπ, and γx are constant coefficients. As 
is usually assumed, rπγ * += .  
     In section 2.1 (Step 1), central banks are not explicitly considered because they 
are not assumed to be independent of governments. However, in actuality, central banks 
are independent organizations in most countries even though some of them are not 
sufficiently independent. Furthermore, in the conventional inflation model, the central 
banks control inflation and governments have no role in controlling inflation. 
Conventional inflation models show that the rate of inflation basically converges at the 
target rate of inflation set by a central bank. The target rate of inflation therefore is the 
key exogenous variable that determines the path of inflation in these models.  
     Both the government and the central bank can probably affect the development of 
inflation, but they would do so in different manners, as equation (21) and conventional 
inflation models indicate. However, the objectives of the government and the central 
bank may not be the same. For example, if trend inflation is added to conventional 
models by replacing their aggregate supply equations with equation (21), inflation 
cannot necessarily converge at the target rate of inflation because another key 
exogenous variable ( Gθ ) is included in the models. A government makes inflation 
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develop consistently with equation (21), which implies that inflation will not necessarily 
converge at the target rate of inflation. Conversely, a central bank makes inflation 
converge at the target rate of inflation, which implies that inflation will not necessarily 
develop consistently with equation (21). That is, unless either Gθ  is adjusted to be 
consistent with the target rate of inflation or the target rate of inflation is adjusted to be 
consistent with Gθ , the path of inflation cannot necessarily be determined. Either Gθ  
or the target rate of inflation needs to be an endogenous variable. If a central bank 
dominates, the target rate of inflation remains as the key exogenous variable and Gθ  
should then be an endogenous variable. The reverse is also true.  
     A central bank will be regarded as truly independent if Gθ  is adjusted to the one 
that is consistent with the target rate of inflation set by the central bank. For example, 
suppose that PG θθ >  and a truly independent central bank manipulates the nominal 
interest rate according to the Taylor-type instrument rule (equation [23]). Here, 
 
tG
t
t
s
s vt
πθrdsdvπi +=+= ∫ ∫− +1 1                    (24) 
 
at steady state such that 0=tg& , 0=tx& , 0=tc& , and 0=tk&  by equations (1), (7), 
and (13). If the accelerating inflation rate is higher than the target rate of inflation, the 
central bank can raise the nominal interest rate from tGt πθi +=  (equation [24]) to 
 
ψπθi tGt ++= , 
 
where 0>ψ , by intervening in financial markets to lower the accelerating rate of 
inflation. In this case, the central bank maintains the initial target rate of inflation 
because it is truly independent. The government thus faces a rate of increase of real 
obligations that is higher than Gθ  by the extra rate ψ.
14 If the government lowers Gθ  
so that PG θθ <  and inflation stops accelerating, the central bank will accordingly 
reduce the extra rate ψ . If, however, the government does not accommodate Gθ  to the 
target rate of inflation, the extra rate ψ  will increase as time passes because the gap 
between the accelerating inflation rate and the target rate of inflation widens by 
equation (21) (i.e., by equation [17]) and γx in Taylor-type instrument rules is usually 
larger than unity, say 1.5. Because of the extra rate ψ , the government has no other 
way to achieve optimization unless it lowers Gθ  to a rate of time preference that is 
consistent with the target rate of inflation. Once the government recognizes that the 
central bank is firmly determined to be independent and it is useless to try to intervene 
in the central bank’s decision-making, the government would not again dare to attempt 
to raise Gθ . 
     Equation (17) implies that a government allows inflation to accelerate because it 
                                                          
14 The extra rate ψ affects not only the behavior of government but also that of the representative 
household, in which the conventional inflation theory is particularly interested. In this sense, the central 
bank’s instrument rule that concerns and simultaneously affects behaviors of both the government and the 
representative household is particularly important for price stability. 
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acts to maximize its expected utility based only on its own preferences. A government is 
not the only entity that cannot easily control its own preferences even when these 
preferences may result in unfavorable consequences. It may not even be possible to 
manipulate one’s own preferences at will. Thus, even though a government is fully 
rational and is not weak, foolish, or untruthful, it still can have difficulty self-regulating 
its preferences. Hence, an independent neutral organization is needed to help control 
Gθ . Delegating the authority to set and keep the target rate of inflation to an 
independent central bank is a way to control Gθ . The delegated independent central 
bank will control Gθ  because it is not the central bank’s preference to stabilize the 
price level—it is simply a duty delegated to it. An independent central bank is not the 
only possible choice. For example, pegging the local currency with a foreign currency 
can be seen as a kind of delegation to an independent neutral organization. In addition, 
the gold standard that prevailed before World War II can be also seen as a type of such 
delegation. 
     Note also that the delegation may not be viewed as bad from the Leviathan 
government’s point of view because only its rate of time preference is changed, and the 
government can still pursue its political objectives. One criticism of the argument that 
central banks should be independent (e.g., Blinder 1998) is that, since the 
time-inconsistency problem argued in Kydland and Prescott (1977) or Barro and 
Gordon (1983) is more acute with fiscal policy, why is it not also necessary to delegate 
fiscal policies? An economically Leviathan government, however, will never allow 
fiscal policies to be delegated to an independent neutral organization because the 
Leviathan government would then not be able to pursue its political objectives, which in 
a sense would mean the death of the Leviathan government. The median household that 
backs the Leviathan government, but at the same time dislikes high inflation, will 
therefore support the delegation of authority but only if it concerns monetary policy. 
The independent central bank will then be given the authority to control Gθ  and oblige 
the government to change Gθ  to meet the target rate of inflation. 
     Without such a delegation of authority, it is likely that generally PG θθ >  
because Gθ  represents the median household whereas Pθ  represents the mean 
household. Empirical studies indicate that the rate of time preference negatively 
correlates with permanent income (e.g., Lawrance 1991), and the permanent income of 
the median household is usually lower than that of the mean household. If generally 
PG θθ > , inflation will tend to accelerate unless a central bank is independent. The 
independence of the central bank is therefore very important in keeping the path of 
inflation stable. 
     Note also that the forced adjustments of Gθ  by an independent central bank are 
exogenous shocks to both the government and the representative household because 
they are planned solely by the central bank. When a shock on Gθ  is given, the 
government and the representative household must recalculate their optimal paths 
including the path of inflation by resetting Gθ , τπ , and φ  in equation (17).     
 
2.2.5  The degree of central bank independence 
     Because central bank independence (CBI) is an essential factor for determining 
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inflation paths, the amount of independence of the central bank is quite important for 
inflation dynamics. CBI is not necessarily an unambiguous concept, however, so it is 
important to define it lucidly before using the concept. Legal independence may be 
easily defined, but the key factor that determines inflation paths is actual independence. 
Cukierman (2005) argues that legal independence is only one, albeit nonnegligible, 
factor that determines the actual independence of a central bank, and to develop a 
comprehensive measure of actual CBI, it is necessary to consider the entire institutional 
and economic structure within which the central bank operates (see also, e.g., Alesina 
1988; Grilli et al. 1991; Cukierman 1992; Cukierman et al. 1992; Cukierman and Webb 
1995; Jacome 2001). Although actual CBI is important, it is generally difficult to define 
because it relates to the entire institutional and economic structure. However, given the 
argument presented in section 2.2.4, the degree of CBI can be defined as the amount of 
control a central bank has over Gθ , and in the model, CBI is defined on the basis of this 
idea. The specific formulation of the degree of CBI is shown in Step 3 (section 2.3).  
     Cukierman (2005) also argues that laws are normally highly incomplete, leaving 
actual implementation open to interpretation and interference by other institutions 
within the public sector, and even when the law is clear and complete, there may be 
slippages between the letter of the law and actual practice due to imperfect compliance. 
This argument has the important implication that actual CBI is time-variable. Because 
law is incomplete and compliance with the law is imperfect, there is plenty of room for 
monetary policy actions that are not strictly based on a rule but are instead taken 
through negotiations and power struggles between a government and a central bank (e.g., 
Meltzer 2003; Wood 2005). Equation (23) then cannot necessarily be implemented 
always as initially intended by the central bank; thus, some parameter values in equation 
(23), particularly the target rate of inflation ( *π ), need be adjusted in some cases. 
Consequences of confrontations will differ on each occasion, depending on the 
economic, social, and political conditions in each period. On some occasions, the central 
bank will win. On other occasions, the government will win, and sometimes they will 
draw. The actual degree of CBI, therefore, will fluctuate over time. The degree of 
fluctuation can be well described with a Markov chain. 
 
2.3  Step 3: Models of inflation 
2.3.1  Model I: A model with a completely independent central bank 
     Model I is a model of inflation in which the central bank is completely 
independent. As argued in section 2.2 (Step 2), if the central bank is completely 
independent, then the time preference rate of the government, that is, Gθ  at t ( tGθ , ), is 
a time-dependent endogenous variable, whereas the target rate of the central bank ( *π ) 
is constant. Hence, Model I consists of the following four equations: 
 
Aggregate supply equation: 
 
         ( ) 1121 1 ++++ ++−+= tt|txt|tPTφPt εxαπθπθπ  
   ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]2lnexp161lnexp6 2211 +−−−+−+ ++++ φtzθθφtzθ ttG,PttG,  
   ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]{ }2lnexp11lnexp6 21 +−−−+−− ++ φtzθφtzθ tPtP .           (21) 
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Aggregate demand equation: 
 ( ) 12121 +++++ +−−−= tt|tt|trt|tt ηrπiβxx                 (22) 
 
Instrument rule for a central bank: 
 ( ) tx*tπt xγππγγi +−+=                     (23) 
 
Government’s time preference: 
 
( )
( )[ ] Pt
t
s
ts|t
s
Px
T
φt
tG, θφtz
εxθαππ
θ ++−
−−−−
=
+
+
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=
+
−
+
+
∑
1lnexp6
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 .           (25) 
 
     The first three equations are same as those in conventional inflation models 
except for the terms related to trend inflation in equation (21). The fourth equation (25) 
is derived from equations (17) and (20), replacing Gθ  with tGθ , . The endogenous 
variable tGθ ,  is adjusted so as to satisfy equation (25). Because tGθ ,  is fully under the 
control of the completely independent central bank, inflation soon stabilizes and 
non-zero trends disappear such that ( ) =−−−− +∞
=
+
−
+ ∑ 1
1
1
1 1 t
s
ts|t
s
Px
T
φt εxθαππ  
01 =−+ TφTt ππ . Hence, equation (25) is asymptotically reduced to the equation PtG θθ =,  
and the aggregate supply equation (21) accordingly approaches a conventional pure 
NKPC such that 
 ( ) 1121 1 ++++ ++−= tt|txt|tPt εxαπθπ  
 
for 0=Tφπ . Model I, therefore, is not a special but a conventional inflation model, and 
inflation is determined by the three equations (21), (22), and (23) with PtG θθ =, .  
 
2.3.2  Model II: A model with a completely dependent central bank 
     In Model II the central bank is completely dependent. Because the government 
completely dominates the central bank, the target rate of inflation, that is *π  at t ( *tπ ), 
is a time-dependent endogenous variable, whereas the time preference of government 
( Gθ ) is constant. Model II therefore consists of the following four equations: 
 
Trend-following inflation:  
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ } ( ) tttPxttPGtt εεxθαφtzφtzθθππ −+−−−−+−−+= +−++ 1111 1lnexp1lnexp6  (26) 
 
Reversed aggregate supply equation: 
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x
t
t|tt α
εxx 111 +++ +=                         (27) 
 
Reversed aggregate demand equation: 
 
12
112
1 ++
+++
+ ++++−= tt|t
r
ttt|t
t ξrπβ
ηxx
i                (28) 
 
Reversed instrument rule for a central bank: 
 
t
π
txtt
t πγ
xγγi
π +−−−=*                      (29) 
 
where 1+tξ is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and rπγ tt += * , which is a modification 
of the usual assumption rπγ * += .15 
     In Model II, optimal trend inflation (equation [17] or equivalently [18]) is 
exogenously determined with constant Gθ . Overall inflation has to follow this 
exogenously determined trend inflation as indicated in equation (26), which is obtained 
by substituting equation (20) into equation (18). Therefore the nature of Model II is 
completely different from that of the conventional inflation model. Because overall 
inflation merely follows the trend inflation, the aggregate supply equation (21) with 
constant Gθ  is no longer the equation that determines inflation. Instead the aggregate 
supply equation (21) is transformed to the reversed aggregate supply equation (27), 
which determines output gaps consistently with equation (21) and inflation determined 
by equation (26). Equation (27) is obtained by substituting equation (26) into equation 
(21) with a constant Gθ . Equation (27) indicates that output gaps are independent of 
inflation. This type of situation may typically be observed during hyperinflation. 
Because output gaps are determined by the reversed aggregate supply equation (27), the 
aggregate demand equation (22) is no longer the equation that determines output gaps. 
Instead, with exogenously determined inflation (equation [26]) and output gaps 
(equation [27]), the aggregate demand equation (22) is transformed to the reversed 
aggregate demand equation (28), which determines the nominal interest rate it 
consistently with equation (22) (i.e. with =+ t|ti 1 rπβ
ηxx
t|t
r
ttt|t +++− ++++ 2112 ). The central 
bank accordingly follows the nominal interest rate (equation [28]) as well as inflation 
(equation [26]) and output gaps (equation [27]) that the market requires. It 
accommodatingly adjusts the target rate of inflation consistently with these variables, 
and the instrument rule (equation [23]) is transformed to the reversed instrument rule for 
a completely dependent central bank (equation [29]).  
 
2.3.3  Model III: A unified model 
                                                          
15 Hence, equation (29) is equivalent to 
π
tπtxtt
t γ
πγxγri
π −
−−−=
1
* .  
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     As discussed in section 2.2.5, even if a central bank is established as an 
independent organization, the government usually influences the central bank to some 
extent. Hence, in practice, a government does not fully adjust its time preference rate, 
and the central bank has to adjust its target rate of inflation to compensate for an 
insufficiently adjusted tGθ , . Whether it is the government or the central bank that 
makes the larger adjustment to its preference or target rate, respectively, will depend on 
the degree of CBI. If the degree of CBI is relatively high, then tGθ ,  will receive the 
larger adjustment; if CBI is low, the reverse will be true. Therefore, a general inflation 
model that can describe all of the movements of inflation, including Models I and II as 
special cases, is needed. Model III is such a general model and consists of the following 
five equations: 
 
Aggregate supply equation:  
 
         ( ) 1121 1 ++++ ++−+= tt|txt|tPTφPt εxαπθπθπ  
   ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]2lnexp161lnexp6 2211 +−−−+−+ ++++ φtzθθφtzθ ttG,PttG,  
   ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]{ }2lnexp11lnexp6 21 +−−−+−− ++ φtzθφtzθ tPtP .           (21) 
 
Aggregate demand equation: 
 ( ) 12121 +++++ +−−−= tt|tt|trt|tt ηrπiβxx                 (22) 
 
Instrument rule for a central bank: 
 ( ) txttπtt xγππγγi +−+= *                     (30) 
 
Government’s time preference: 
 
( )
( )[ ] Pt
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s
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s
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tG, θφtz
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1 .           (25) 
 
Degree of CBI: 
 
( ) *tt*t*t πχπχπ ˆ1 −+=                      (31) 
 
where ( )01 ≥≥ tt χχ  is a Markov chain with the stationary distribution *χ , *π  is 
*
tπ  if the central bank is completely independent (thus *π  is constant), and *tπˆ  is 
the imaginary target rate of inflation that would be set and adjusted if the central bank 
were completely dependent. The path of *tπˆ  is computed using Model II. Endogenous 
variables are tπ , tx , ti , tGθ , , and *tπ . 
     The first four equations are same as those in Model I except the target rate of 
inflation in equation (30) is replaced with the endogenous one ( *tπ ). The endogenous 
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target rate of inflation ( *tπ ) is determined by the fifth equation (31) in which the 
time-varying CBI is incorporated with tχ . The variable tχ  indicates the ratio of *π  
considered in *tπ  instead of *tπˆ . It represents how much of the influence of *π  
remains when *tπ is determined, that is, how firmly tGθ ,  is controlled by the central 
bank, thus indicating the degree of CBI. As argued in section 2.2 (Step 2), the degree of 
CBI ( tχ ) will fluctuate over time. In Model III, it fluctuates according to a Markov 
chain that describes the consequence of negotiations and power struggles between the 
government and the central bank. The mean of tχ  ( χ ) indicates the average degree 
of CBI. If 1=χ , then the central bank is completely independent, and if 0=χ , then 
it is completely dependent.  
     The time preference rate of government ( tGθ , ) does not necessarily approach Pθ  
as time passes, because ( ) 1
1
1
1 1 +
∞
=
+
−
+ −−−− ∑ t
s
ts|t
s
Px
T
φt εxθαππ
T
φ
T
t ππ −= +1  is not 
necessarily guaranteed to increase less than ( )[ ]1lnexp6 1 +−+ φtzt  as time passes in 
equation (25). 
 
3  THE BASIC NATURE OF MODEL III 
 
3.1  A unified, microfounded, and purely forward-looking model 
     All of the agents in Model III (i.e., households, firms, a government, and a central 
bank) are equally rational and optimize their objectives purely in forward-looking 
manners. The key difference among them affecting inflation dynamics is only the 
heterogeneity in their preferences. No assumptions of special and ad hoc friction or 
irrationality are required. With these distinguished properties, Model III can explain 
many essential aspects of inflation. 
     As χ  approaches unity, equation (31) becomes identical to **t ππ = , and 
Model III is reduced to Model I (i.e., a conventional inflation model). Inflation 
stabilizes around a constant target rate of inflation *π  set by the completely 
independent central bank. An example of the path of inflation when 1=χ  is shown 
in Figure 4. Conversely, as χ  approaches zero, equation (31) becomes identical to 
*
t
*
t ππ ˆ= . In this case, the central bank continuously adjusts the target rate of inflation 
in each period to keep consistent with a constant Gθ ; that is, Model III is reduced to 
Model II, and inflation begins to deviate greatly unless PG θθ = (Fig. 4). When 
10 << χ , the path of inflation varies between the paths shown for the cases of 
1=χ  and 0=χ  (Fig. 4).  
     Model III can therefore generate any type of inflation (e.g., hyperinflation, 
chronic inflation, disinflation, low and stable inflation, deflation, etc.) by setting various 
parameter values for the degree of CBI represented by the Markov chain tχ  and the 
difference of time preferences between government and households ( PG θθ − ). This 
distinguished nature of Model III enables a unified and microfounded explanation for 
various types of inflation, each of which is presented in the following sections.  
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3.2  Types of inflation 
3.2.1  Hyperinflation  
     Model III indicates that hyperinflation will be generated in a very short period if 
Gθ  is unusually higher than usual and the central bank is not at all independent 
( 0≅χ ).16 Faced with a an unusually high Gθ , people expect extremely high inflation 
and inflation explodes as equation (26) (equation [21] with 0≅χ ) indicates. What 
factors would contribute to a unusually higher Gθ  than usual? Hyperinflation has often 
been observed when governments were very fragile and unstable, for example, after a 
defeat in war or after a revolution. Germany after WWI, Japan and Hungary after WWII, 
and Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union are typical examples of hyperinflation. 
If a government is fragile and unstable, not only households but the government itself 
will anticipate that the regime may soon collapse. If the probability of the end of a 
regime is very high, it is likely that the government will behave very myopically (e.g., 
Fisher 1930; Yaari 1965). The government will not put a high value on the future, but it 
will struggle to survive in the present. In such a situation, it is not likely that the 
government will listen to the advice of a central bank, and the central bank will have 
little or no independence ( 0≅χ ). The very fragile and unstable government’s 
considerably myopic behavior will cause extremely high inflation expectations and then 
hyperinflation by equation (26). This explanation appears more natural than Cagan’s 
(1956) hyperinflation model, in which it is suggested that hyperinflation basically 
occurs irrespective of the fragility or stability of the government.  
     The optimal trend inflation (equation [17]) implies another type of hyperinflation. 
Even if Gθ  is not unusually high, hyperinflation will eventually be observed if no 
action is taken when there are relatively large positive values of PG θθ − . The 
hyperinflation observed in some countries in South America for the past several decades 
(sometimes called “modern hyperinflation”) may be examples of this type of 
hyperinflation. The situation in which relatively large positive values of PG θθ − are left 
as they are implies that a central bank is only somewhat independent, that is, χ  is 
positive but close to zero. The combination of an unusually myopic government and a 
dependent central bank will generate this type of hyperinflation.  
     Model III indicates that hyperinflation is not caused by the growth of money (i.e., 
not by seigniorage) but by the unusually myopic preference of a government combined 
with a scarcely independent central bank. This view is consistent with the conclusions 
of Sargent and Wallace (1973) and Fischer et al. (2002). They conclude that causation 
runs from inflation to money growth during hyperinflation, and that once high inflation 
                                                          
16 When Gθ  is unusually high, the weight ∫ −tt tv
tt
dvB
B
1 ,
,  in it is much larger than ∫ −
−
t
t tv
tt
dvB
B
1 ,
,1  
and thus ti  will be closer to rdsπ
t
t s
+∫ +1  than rdsdvπtt ss v +∫ ∫− +1 1 . Hence, for example, 
the path of inflation will be closer to ( )( )φtθθππ PGφt −−+= 2  rather than 
( )( )26 φtθθππ PGφt −−+= . 
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has been triggered, monetary policy has typically been accommodative, as equation (31) 
implies. The explanation is also consistent with Sargent’s (1982) view that a credible 
change in policies, preferably embedded in legal and institutional changes, could bring a 
hyperinflation to an end at a very small cost. Sargent (1982) implies that the main cause 
of hyperinflation is the behavior of government. Model III indicates that, if the 
incumbent government is replaced with or changes itself into a government that has a 
much lower rate of time preference or if the authority to set and keep the target rate of 
inflation is delegated to a truly independent neutral organization that is obliged to 
stabilize the price level, high inflation expectations soon subside and the ongoing 
hyperinflation will be brought to an end at a small cost.  
     Model III also indicates that the mechanism of hyperinflation can be explained 
without any ad hoc assumption of irrationality or friction, whereas Cagan’s (1956) 
well-known hyperinflation model needs the assumption of adaptive expectations or 
some ad hoc frictions if large budget deficits are allowed in the model (e.g., 
Auernheimer 1976; Evans and Yarrow 1981; Kiguel 1989). Model III indicates that 
hyperinflation is nothing more than a consequence of the various values of deep 
parameters (i.e., the time preference rate of the government and the degree of CBI), and 
no additional or special mechanism is necessary to explain it. 
 
3.2.2  Chronic inflation  
     Chronic inflation occurs when relatively high rates of inflation are sustained for a 
relatively long period. Many industrialized countries experienced chronic inflation in 
the 1960s and 1970s, and this period is often called "the Great Inflation". Equation (17) 
implies that chronic inflation will be observed if there is a combination of sporadic 
periods in which PG θθ >  and regular periods in which PG θθ ≅ . Once a positive 
PG θθ −  is allowed (even for a short period), equation (17) implies that inflation will 
start to accelerate. The acceleration will stop when PG θθ =  is restored. However, the 
higher rate of inflation and higher inflation expectations are retained because PG θθ <  is 
necessary to decrease inflation.  
     Model III indicates that the combination of sporadic periods in which PG θθ >  
and regular periods in which PG θθ ≅  is consistent with a partially independent central 
bank (e.g., 5.0=χ ). This type of central bank cannot sufficiently control Gθ  and 
will sometimes fail to prevent the occurrence of a situation in which PG θθ > . Moreover, 
because of insufficient independence, the central bank usually will not be able to force 
the government to lower Gθ  to PG θθ <  even if PG θθ <  is necessary to decrease 
inflation. As a result, the combination of a relatively more myopic government and an 
insufficiently independent central bank can generate chronic inflation.    
     Once the situation in which PG θθ >  is allowed, the target rate of inflation needs 
to be raised by equation (31) because *tπˆ  rises as time passes when PG θθ > . Clarida et 
al. (2000), Favero and Rovelli (2001), and Dennis (2001) conclude that the target rate of 
inflation in the pre-Volker era was much higher than that in the Volker-Greenspan era. 
Equation (31) suggests that the reason central banks at the time set high inflation targets 
is not because they deliberately committed the “crime” of high inflation. Instead, they 
were forced to raise the target rates of inflation because they were not sufficiently 
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independent.17  
 
3.2.3  Disinflation 
     Disinflation occurs when a high rate of inflation gradually declines to a low and 
stable rate of inflation, but the decline does not reach deflation. A typical episode was 
experienced in many industrialized countries in the 1980s after the Great Inflation. 
Equation (17) indicates that disinflation will be observed when the condition of PG θθ <  
is gradually adjusted to one in which PG θθ =  as the rate of inflation declines to a low 
and stable rate. 
     Model III indicates that a truly independent central bank (i.e., high χ ) is 
necessary for disinflation because Gθ  must be gradually shifted from PG θθ <  to 
PG θθ = . A government will not be able to discipline itself to keep PG θθ <  because it 
generally prefers the opposite condition ( PG θθ > ). In contrast, this gradual adjustment 
can be easily implemented by a truly independent central bank because they can force 
the government to keep PG θθ < , and the central bank can gradually tune the target rate 
of inflation as well as Gθ  as inflation cools down. Eventually the rate of inflation will 
land softly at a low and stable rate.  
     High inflation before disinflation indicates that a central bank was not sufficiently 
independent before disinflation. Hence, a point at which a central bank abruptly 
becomes truly independent, that is, χ  is raised significantly, is necessary for 
disinflation. Taylor (2001, 2002) emphasizes the importance of changes in economic 
and political leadership as a cause of the Great Inflation by quoting Milton Friedman, 
who argued that the Great Inflation was a fundamentally political, not economic, 
phenomenon and that Ronald Reagan ended the Great Inflation by accepting a severe 
recession without bringing pressure on the Federal Reserve to reverse course. Similarly, 
Meltzer (2005) emphasizes the large role of political decision-making during the Great 
Inflation and concludes that the Federal Reserve was better able to control inflation 
during the administrations of Presidents Eisenhower and Reagan rather than those of 
Presidents Johnson, Carter, or Nixon. In other words, keeping the independence of the 
central bank is the key to stabilizing inflation. This view is consistent with the 
explanation for disinflation offered in this paper. 
 
3.2.4  Low and stable inflation 
     Equation (17) indicates that, if inflation is initially low and PG θθ =  is maintained, 
a low and stable rate of inflation will be sustained. Model III indicates that a truly 
independent central bank (i.e., high χ ) is necessary for low and stable inflation 
                                                          
17 Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) and Barro and Gordon’s (1983) well-known explanation for chronic 
inflation needs exceptionally large or successive negative supply shocks and thus needs internationally 
common shocks to explain the international aspect of the Great Inflation. It is hard to find such shocks in 
many industrialized countries during the Great Inflation. The explanation in this paper can explain the 
international aspect of the Great Inflation without assuming such shocks because it concerns only the 
attitudes of the governments and the central banks. The governments and central banks in most 
industrialized countries during the Great Inflation seem to have assumed common attitudes because the 
economic policies conducted in the United States were often imitated by other countries. 
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because it forces the government to keep PG θθ =  completely and indefinitely.  
 
3.2.5  Deflation 
     Equation (17) indicates that, if the condition in which PG θθ <  continues over 
time, deflation will eventually occur. Nevertheless, deflation will be rarely observed 
because governments generally prefer PG θθ > , and it is unlikely that a central bank 
would dare to attempt deflation and set a target rate of deflation.18 In fact, among the 
industrialized countries, only Japan in the 1990s and 2000s has experienced deflation 
since World War II.  
     How can deflation occur if a government generally prefers PG θθ >  and a central 
bank exerts itself to hold PG θθ =  for a positive target rate of inflation? A huge 
negative exogenous shock that greatly widens the output gap may temporarily make the 
price level decline, but that would not necessarily be regarded as deflation because 
deflation means a successive decline of the price level. The possibility for deflation 
arises when a shock considerably raises Pθ .
19 It may rarely happen, but if Pθ  becomes 
higher and Gθ  stays constant, then it is possible for the condition PG θθ <  to occur. If 
this condition is left unchanged, then deflation will be observed by equation (21). The 
higher Pθ  means a lower level of consumption at steady state, and a recession as well 
as a deflation will generally be observed if Pθ  is raised. Nevertheless, if the central 
bank raises Gθ  so that PG θθ ≥  immediately after the shock, deflation will be 
prevented. However, if the central bank does not respond quickly, deflation will occur.  
     Once deflation takes root, it is very difficult for even a truly independent central 
bank to control Gθ  and reverse the deflation because of the zero bound of the nominal 
interest rate. As shown in section 2.2.4, an independent central bank controls Gθ  by 
manipulating the nominal interest rate with the extra rate ψ. Thus, if the central bank 
cannot manipulate the nominal interest rate because of the zero bound, it also cannot 
control Gθ . The central bank may advise the government to raise its preference Gθ  so 
far as PG θθ >  to reverse the deflation, but it cannot force the government to make 
PG θθ > .20 Furthermore, if the deflation deepens to a point where the real interest rate is 
compelled to exceed the marginal productivity, the economy cannot achieve a stable 
equilibrium anymore. The Great Depression in the 1930s may have been such a case, 
                                                          
18 In the case of the gold standard that prevailed before World War II, deflation may be observed 
relatively more frequently because the gold standard indicates that the target rate of inflation is zero.   
19 Since the era of Böhm-Bawerk and Fisher, the rate of time preference has been naturally regarded as 
time-variable. See, for example, Böhm-Bawerk (1889), Fisher (1930), and Uzawa (1968).   
20 If the time preference rates of the median and the representative households became nearly equal due 
to the shock that raised Pθ  and PG θθ ≅  is kept, deflation may continue for a long period even though 
the incumbent government is replaced. However, if the time preference rate of the median household is 
raised similarly to Pθ  due to the shock, then a replacement of government would reverse deflation 
because the newly elected government will have the same high rate of time preference as the raised time 
preference rate of the median household. The election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933 may 
have been such a case. Nevertheless, even if deflation is reversed, the other problems caused by a raised 
Pθ  will remain.  
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whereas Japan in the 1990s may have narrowly averted such a situation.21 
     Ahearne et al. (2002) argue that, to prevent deflation like the one experienced in 
Japan in the 1990s, both monetary and fiscal stimulus should go beyond the levels 
conventionally implied. For example, they argue, if the Bank of Japan had lowered 
short-term interest rates by a further 200 basis points at any time between 1991 and 
early 1995, deflation could indeed have been avoided. This view implies that there are 
unusual incidents behind deflation, and it seems consistent with the argument that Pθ  
is unusually high in cases of deflation.22 Equation (17) suggests that, to prevent 
deflation, it is necessary to raise Gθ  above the unusually high Pθ  as soon as possible 
by imposing an unusually large negative extra rate ψ. Thus, deflation will be prevented 
if a central bank acts quickly and decisively, probably as the Federal Reserve under 
Chairman Greenspan attempted during the recession in the early 2000s. However, 
because shocks that make PG θθ −  considerably negative seem to occur rarely, even a 
truly independent central bank may fail to respond quickly enough to such a shock 
owing to a lack of experience. 
 
4  INFLATION PERSISTENCE 
 
     It has been argued that an important unresolved issue is a microfounded 
mechanism that generates substantial intrinsic inflation persistence (Galí et al., 2005; 
Fuhrer, 2006; Woodford, 2007). Model III offers a response to this argument, and in this 
section, I explain the microfounded mechanism of intrinsic inflation persistence with 
Model III. 
 
4.1  Optimal trend inflation and intrinsic inflation persistence 
     Although all of the agents optimize their objectives purely in forward-looking 
manners, Model III is consistent with observations indicating that inflation possesses a 
backward-looking property and is substantially persistent. The key factor is the optimal 
trend inflation generated as a consequence of simultaneous optimization. Whether 
inflation is persistent ultimately hinges on the type of mean assumed when estimating 
persistence. Mean reversion and most measures of persistence are inversely 
related—basically, the more substantial the persistence, the lower the mean reversion 
and vice versa (e.g., Marques 2004). The trend component in inflation (equation [17]) is 
a mean-reverting process, and inflation itself in Model III is also a mean-reverting 
process because the trend component is included in equation (19) (or equivalently 
equation [21]). On the other hand, it is implicitly assumed that the mean of inflation is 
constant at steady state in autoregressive process models. Hence, if Model III is true, but 
inflation is assumed mistakenly to be an autoregressive process, most measures of 
persistence (e.g., the sum of the autoregressive coefficients) will spuriously indicate that 
inflation is substantially persistent and possesses a backward-looking property. From an 
experimental study, Sbordone (2007) concludes that, although a model has no intrinsic 
                                                          
21 In the early 1930s, the ex post real interest rate in the United States was roughly 10% (e.g., Bernanke 
1995), whereas that in Japan in the 1990s was generally less than 5% (e.g., Ito 2003). 
22 Harashima (2004a) estimates that Pθ  in Japan rose by roughly 2% at the end of the 1980s, just before 
the deflation that occurred during the 1990s and 2000s. 
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persistence (but instead has trends), the hypothesis that there is a significant source of 
intrinsic persistence in inflation dynamics could not be rejected with 90% confidence. 
Model III therefore implies that substantial intrinsic inflation persistence is merely an 
illusion or a consequence of serious misspecification.  
 
4.2  Trend breaks 
     Trend inflation has another important feature that greatly affects the nature of 
inflation persistence—trends in inflation often break. If a central bank is completely 
dependent ( 0=χ ) or completely independent ( 1=χ ), a trend may continue for long 
periods without any break. However, if a central bank is partially independent 
( 10 << χ ), the degree of CBI will vary over time as previously argued and trend 
breaks will often occur. In the case where 10 << χ , a central bank cannot always 
sufficiently control Gθ . In some periods, a central bank may relatively firmly control 
Gθ , but in other periods, it may not. This variation in CBI makes many trend breaks 
occur and the path of inflation zigzag. This mechanism is modeled using a Markov 
chain ( )10 ≤≤ tt χχ  in Model III.   
     An important consequence of the existence of many inflation trend breaks is that 
inflation appears to be substantially persistent and almost follow a random walk (e.g., 
Perron 1989; Lumsdaine and Papell 1997). Without breaks, trend inflation can easily be 
distinguished from a random walk. With many trend breaks, however, it is far less 
distinguishable and will often be spuriously observed as following a random walk. 
Levin and Piger (2004) conclude that, allowing for a break in intercept, inflation 
measures generally exhibit relatively low inflation persistence for many industrial 
economies and, evidently, substantial inflation persistence is not an inherent 
characteristic of industrial economies (see also Marques 2004). 
 
4.3  High/low degree of persistence during high/low inflation 
     Many empirical studies have indicated that persistence of inflation was substantial 
in the 1970s and then declined in many industrialized economies. For example, Cogley 
and Sargent (2005) conclude that persistence of inflation increased during the 1970s, 
then fell in the 1980s and 1990s. Barsky (1987) and Evans and Watchel (1993) report 
that during the Great Inflation in the 1970s, the path of inflation looks like a random 
walk. On the other hand, Barsky (1987), Evans and Watchel (1993), Cogley and Sargent 
(2002), and Levin and Piger (2004) argue that lower persistence is observed during 
periods of low and stable inflation, a typical example of which is the recent low and 
stable inflation observed in many industrialized economies. These phenomena suggest 
that some mechanism exists such that substantial persistence is observed during high 
inflation and vice versa. Model III can offer a reasonable explanation for such a 
mechanism.  
     High rates of inflation imply that a central bank is not fully independent and 
cannot manipulate the nominal interest rate sufficiently to stabilize inflation. Model III 
indicates that the optimal trend inflation dominates a large part of the inflation path in 
such a case. Therefore, if an autoregressive process is mistakenly applied to high 
inflation as the model to estimate its persistence, then a high degree of persistence will 
be spuriously observed. In addition, as argued above, there will be many large-scale 
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trend breaks in inflation according to the Markov chain tχ  in cases where χ  is 
neither nearly zero nor unity. If an autoregressive process is applied in such cases, it 
will often lead to the incorrect conclusion inflation follows a random walk. The Great 
Inflation in the 1970s seems to be a typical example of this kind of phenomenon. 
     Conversely, if the central bank is completely independent ( 1=χ ), the aggregate 
supply equation (21) is reduced to a pure NKPC such that 
 ( ) 1121 1 ++++ ++−= tt|txt|tPt εxαπθπ  
 
as shown in section 2.3.1, and inflation stabilizes at a low rate. Only inherited 
persistence from |ttx 1+  and, as Fuhrer (2006) argues, probably only a small amount of 
inflation persistence will therefore be observed even if an autoregressive process model 
is applied to capture persistence.23 Nevertheless, a completely independent central bank 
( 1=χ ) seems quite rare. Even though central banks are designed to be as independent 
as possible, governments in actuality still influence central banks to some extent; for 
example, a government generally keeps the power to designate the head and board 
members of its central bank. Cukierman (2005) argues that the economic and 
institutional structures within which a central bank operates affect the actual 
independence of the central bank, even for a given level of tightly respected legal 
independence. Even in industrialized economies, therefore, the average degree of actual 
CBI ( χ ) will be high but still lower than unity. Hence, Model III predicts that, even if 
inflation is low and stable, non-zero inflation trends remain, although their slopes are 
fairly mild, and small-scale trend breaks still occur. As a result, if an autoregressive 
model is applied, moderate to low persistence will be observed in inflation during low 
and stable inflation.  
 
4.4  The hybrid NKPC and optimal trend inflation 
     Woodford (2007) argues that trend inflation is highly correlated with lagged 
inflation, so that omission of trend inflation could result in spurious positive coefficients 
on lagged inflation in estimates of the hybrid NKPC equation (see also Cogley and 
Sbordone 2006). For example, consider if a hybrid NKPC such that 
 ( ) 1|1|21 1 ++++ ++−+= tttxtttt εxαπκπκπ  
 
is selected as a model to estimate a Phillips curve, although the true data generation 
mechanism is the trend-augmented NKPC (equation [19]). Then the value of the 
parameter κ  will be calculated as the one that on average satisfies ( ) =−+ tt|t ππκ 2  ( )t|tT t|tPT t|tT t|t ππθππ 2212 ++++ −−−  for the sample period because the estimated value of  
κ  must be consistent with equation (19). Here, ( )t|tT t|tP ππθ 22 ++ −  will be negligibly 
smaller than T t|t
T
t|t ππ 12 ++ −  for sufficiently small Pθ ; thus, 
                                                          
23 If a univariate AR model is used, moderate to low persistence may be observed due to autocorrelations 
in tx . 
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κ
ππ
ππ
T
t|t
T
t|t
ttt
12
|2
++
+
−≅− . 
 
If trend inflation moves steadily during two periods from t  to 2+t , as equation (17) 
indicates, and it occasionally changes its direction upward or downward due to trend 
breaks, then on average Tt
T
t|t ππ −+ 2 ( ) ( ) ( )T t|tT t|tTtT t|tT t|tT t|t ππππππ 12112 2 +++++ −≅−+−= . As 
equation (20) indicates, inflation is a process proceeding around trend inflation in 
Model III and thus on average Tt
T
ttttt ππππ −≅− ++ |2|2  and 
 ( )T ttT ttttt ππππ |1|2|2 2 +++ −≅− , 
 
which means 
 
5.0≅κ . 
 
Model III therefore predicts that a statistically significant value of κ  in the hybrid 
NKPC will spuriously be estimated to be about 0.5. Most empirical estimates of κ  
indicate that the value of κ  is neither nearly zero nor nearly unity but that it is between 
0.3 and 0.6 (e.g., Galí and Gertler 1999; Galí et al. 2001, 2003; Jondeau and Le Bihan 
2005; Rudd and Whelan 2006, 2007; Kurmann 2007) and is statistically significant. 
Particularly when other estimation methods than GMM (the generalized method of 
moments) are used to estimate hybrid NKPC equations, the values of κ  are often 
computed to be nearly 0.5 (e.g., Jondeau and Le Bihan 2005; Kurmann 2007). These 
estimates are consistent with the argument that trend inflation is playing an important 
role in inflation dynamics, as Model III indicates.  
 
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
     Recently it has been argued that the puzzle of persistence in the NKPC will be 
solved if trend inflation is well incorporated into the model. But, incorporating trend 
inflation raises another serious theoretical problem—trend inflation lacks a 
microfoundation. In this paper, I tackled this problem and presented a microfoundation 
for trend inflation. On the basis of this microfoundation, I constructed an inflation 
model, in which both the government and the representative household achieve 
simultaneous optimization. The model indicates that, without an independent central 
bank, inflation accelerates or decelerates if the time preference rates of the government 
and the representative household are heterogeneous. Because a government represents 
the median of households under a proportional representation system and the 
economically representative household represents the mean of households, the 
preferences between them are usually heterogeneous. More importantly, a government 
can barely control its own preferences even if it is fully rational. If a government is left 
without some neutral organization to help control inflation, the risk of considerable 
acceleration of inflation exists. A truly independent central bank is therefore necessary 
to rein in inflation. As the average degree of CBI ( χ ) approaches unity, the model is 
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reduced to a conventional inflation model, and inflation stabilizes. Conversely, as χ  
approaches zero, inflation begins to deviate greatly depending on the difference of 
preferences between government and households. When 10 << χ , the path of 
inflation proceeds between those in the cases of 1=χ  and 0=χ .  
     All of the agents in the model behave in purely forward-looking manners. 
However, the model indicates that inflation spuriously appears to have a 
backward-looking property and to be substantially persistent for a very simple reason. If 
inflation is assumed to be an autoregressive process even though there is a trend, many 
measures of persistence (e.g., the sum of the autoregressive coefficients) will spuriously 
indicate that inflation is substantially persistent. In addition, trends in inflation will 
often break because the degree of CBI will vary over time according to the 
consequences of successive negotiations or power struggles between the government 
and the central bank. The existence of many trend breaks makes inflation appear to be 
substantially persistent and sometimes to appear like it is following a random walk. The 
model therefore implies that substantial intrinsic inflation persistence is merely an 
illusion or a consequence of serious misspecification.  
     Trend inflation has been ignored in models of inflation because of its lack of 
microfoundation. Now that a microfoundation has been presented, trend inflation should 
no longer be ignored as a source of observed substantial inflation persistence. The 
model presented here not only solves the puzzle of inflation persistence, but it enables a 
unified and microfounded explanation for various types of inflation by setting various 
parameter values for the degree of CBI and the difference of preferences between the 
government and the representative household.  Even though the model can explain 
many essential aspects of inflation, it needs no assumptions of special and ad hoc 
friction or irrationality to do so. All of the agents in the model (i.e., households, firms, a 
government, and a central bank) are equally rational and optimize their objectives 
purely in forward-looking manners even though their preferences are not necessarily 
identical.  
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APPENDIX 
 
1 The condition for approximately identical weights 
     If bt is constant (e.g., if it is at steady state), the weights for tst ≤<−1  are 
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     Here, the absolute value of ( ) ( )∫ ∫∫− −+ ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ++⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ +−
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absolute value of dvπ
s
s v∫ +1  if the absolute values of sπ  for 11 +≤<− tst  are 
sufficiently smaller than unity because 1
1
2 s
s
s vs
πdvππ ≤≤ ∫ + ; thus, approximately 
rdsdvπR
t
t
s
s vt
+= ∫ ∫− +1 1 . 
 
2 The transversality condition 
     By equations (7) and (13), tG
t
t
s
s vt
πrdsdvπi +=+= ∫ ∫− + θ1 1 ; thus, Gtt θπi =−  at 
steady state. Substituting the equation Gtt θπi =−  and equation (13) into conditions (4) 
and (5) and solving both differential equations yield the equation 
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( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−−−= ∫ #
t
tttttG, Cdtb
ωxgbλ 1exp  at steady state, where C# is a certain constant. 
Therefore, it is necessary to satisfy 0<−− ttt ωxg  and ∞=∫∞→ dtbtt
1lim  for the 
transversality condition (6) to hold. 
     Here, by condition (5), 
t
ttt
G
t
t
b
ωxg
θ
b
b −−+=&  at steady state. Hence, if 
0=−−+=
t
ttt
G
t
t
b
ωxg
θ
b
b&  at steady state, then tb  is constant; thus, ∞=∫∞→ dtb tt
1lim . 
Thereby, the transversality condition holds. However, if 0<−−+=
t
ttt
G
t
t
b
ωxg
θ
b
b&  at 
steady state, then tb  diminishes to zero and transversality condition (6) cannot hold 
because 0<−− ttt ωxg . If 0>−−+=
t
ttt
G
t
t
b
ωxg
θ
b
b&  at steady state, then G
t
t
t
θ
b
b =∞→
&
lim ; 
thus, tb  increases as time passes and ∫ =∞→
Gt
t θ
Cdt
b
##1lim , where C## is a certain constant. 
Therefore, transversality condition (6) also cannot hold.                         
 
3 Proof of equation (16)  
(Step 1) 
     An inflation stream Atπ  moves on the path ( ) 20 6 tθθππ PGAAt −+= ; thus, 
( )PGtt
s
s
A
v
A
t θθdsdvππ −−= ∫ ∫− +1 1  for any t. Another inflation stream Btπ  is different from 
A
tπ  but satisfies ( )PGtt
s
s
B
v
B
t θθdsdvππ −−= ∫ ∫− +1 1  for t≤0 . Suppose that, during the period 
11 ≤<− t , Btπ  is different from Atπ  only in the two periods, that is, in the period 
between 1−=t  and dtt +−= 1  by ( ) 0ˆ 1
11,
≠−= ∫ +−−+− dsπππ dt AsBsC dtinitial  and in the period 
between dtt −=1  and 1=t  by ( ) ( )C dtinitialdt AsBsCinitial πdsπππ +−− −=−= ∫ 1,111, ˆˆ  for a sufficiently 
small period dt. In other periods during 11 ≤<− t , BtAt ππ =  and thus BA ππ 00 = , 
B
dt
A
dt ππ = , … , BndtAndt ππ =  for 1<ndt , where L,3,2,1=n . 
     In the period between 1=t  and dtt +=1  that is adjacent to the period 11 ≤<− t , 
B
tπ  must be different from Atπ  to achieve BdtAdt ππ = ( )PGdt dt
s
s
A
v θθdsdvπ −−= ∫ ∫+− +1 1  
( )PGdt dt
s
s
B
v θθdsdvπ −−= ∫ ∫+− +1 1  because the difference between Btπ  and Atπ  in the 
period between 1−=t  and dtt +−= 1  is no longer relevant to Bdtπ ; thus, the difference 
between Btπ  and Atπ  in the period between dtt −=1  and 1=t  by 
( ) ( )C dtinitialdt AsBsCinitial πdsπππ +−− −=−= ∫ 1,111, ˆˆ  must be compensated for in other periods and 
not in the period between 1−=t  and dtt +−= 1 . Because Btπ  in the period during 
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11 ≤<+− tdt  is already fixed, the only way to compensate for it is to add 
( ) ( )C dtinitialdt AsBsCinitial πdsπππ +−− =−−=− ∫ 1,111, ˆˆ  in the newly added period between 1=t  
and dtt +=1 . Thereby, Btπ  is different from Atπ  in the period between 1=t  and 
dtt +=1  by C
dtπ Cinitial
π +1,ˆ 1,ˆ ( ) C dtinitialdt AsBsCinitial πdsπππ +−− =−−=−= ∫ 1,111, ˆˆ  due to Cinitialπ 1,ˆ . 
     Successively, in the next period between dtt +=1  and dtt 21+= , Btπ  must also 
be different from Atπ  to achieve BdtAdt ππ 22 = ( )PGdt dt
s
s
A
v θθdsdvπ −−= ∫ ∫+− +2 21 1  
( )PGdt dt
s
s
B
v θθdsdvπ −−= ∫ ∫+− +2 21 1  due to the differences between Btπ  and Atπ  in the 
periods between dtt −=1  and 1=t  and between 1=t  and dtt +=1 . The difference 
in the period between dtt −=1  and 1=t  originating in Cinitialπ 1,ˆ  makes dsdvπdt ss Bv∫ ∫ +0 1  
and dsdvπ
dt
dt
s
s
B
v∫ ∫ +2 1  be different from both dsdvπdt ss Av∫ ∫ +0 1  and dsdvπdtdt ss Av∫ ∫ +2 1  by 
C
dtπ
C
initial C
initial
ππ +=− 1,ˆ1, 1,ˆˆ . Hence, C dtπ Cinitialπ 21,ˆ 1,ˆ +  (i.e., the difference in the period between 
dtt +=1  and dtt 21+=  originating in Cinitialπ 1,ˆ ) is C dtπCinitial Cinitialππ +=− 1,ˆ1, 1,ˆ2ˆ2 . 
     Similarly, C
dtπ
C
dtπ Cinitial
C
initial
ππ ++ = 1,ˆ31,ˆ 1,1, ˆ3ˆ , and thus C dtπC ndtπ CinitialCinitial πnπ ++ = 1,ˆ1,ˆ 1,1, ˆˆ  for dtt −<< 21 . 
In the period between dtt −= 2  and 2=t , C
ndtπCinitial
π +1,ˆ 1,ˆ  begins to decline and is zero 
after 3=t . However, similarly C
ndtdtπC dtinitial
π +++ 1,ˆ 1,ˆ  starts at 1=t , begins to decline in the 
period between 2=t  and dtt += 2 , and is zero after dtt += 3 . Successively, new and 
similar C
ndtdtπC dtinitial
π +++ 21,ˆ 1,ˆ , 
C
ndtdtπC dtinitial
π +++ 31,ˆ 2,ˆ , …, and so forth start and become zero. 
 
(Step 2) 
     As a result, the total difference between  Btπ  and Atπ  in the period between 
( )dtnt 11 −+=  and ndtt +=1  originating in the initial difference C dtinitialπ +−1,ˆ is 
( )
C
ndt,π
C
ndt,π
C
ndt,π
C
ndt,π
C
ndtπ C dtninitial
C
dtinitial
C
dtinitial
C
initial
C
dtinitial
πππππ +++++ −++++− ++++= 11111, 11,21,1,1,1, ˆˆˆˆ L   
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n
v
C
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πvn
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111,
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A
s
B
s
C
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C
dtπC dtinitial
π 21,1,ˆ ++  =
C
dtπCinitial
π +− 1,1,ˆ , C dtπC dtinitialπ 31,21,ˆ ++ = C dtπC dtinitialπ 21,1,ˆ ++− , C dtπC dtinitialπ 41,31,ˆ ++  = C dtπC dtinitialπ 31,21,ˆ ++−  
and so forth; that is, ( )
C
dtnπ C ndtinitial
π
11,1,
ˆ +++  and ( ) ( )
C
dtnπC dtninitial
π
21,11,
ˆ ++++  cancel each other out in 
turn; thus, ( ) ( )∑= +−++−
n
v
C
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πvn
1
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ˆ1 is C dt,π Cinitial,π +1ˆ 1ˆ , 
C
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π +1ˆ 1ˆ , 0, 
C
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π +− 1ˆ 1ˆ , C dt,π Cinitial,π +− 1ˆ 1ˆ , 0, C dt,πCinitial,π +1ˆ 1ˆ , C dt,π Cinitial,π +1ˆ 1ˆ , … for n = 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8, …, 
respectively.  
     Because of the alternate cancelation of ( )
C
dtnπ C ndtinitial
π
11,1,
ˆ +++ , 
C
ndtπ C dtinitial
π ++− 1,1,
 
( ) ( )∑= +−++−=
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1
111,
ˆ1  grows less rapidly than ( )∑
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n
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<  for sufficiently large ( )1>t  where 0C  is a constant. 
  
(Step 3) 
     Suppose another situation in which Atπ  and Btπ  have the same properties as 
shown in (Step 1), but they are initially different in many other periods during 11 ≤<− t . 
Each initial difference between Atπ  and Btπ  in each short period dt during the period 
11 ≤<− t  has the same nature as C
ndtπ C dt
π ++− 1,1  shown above; thus, if ∞<<∞− tπ  for 
11 ≤<− t , Btπ  can be expressed as Atπ  plus the sum of differences that originated in 
these initial differences such that ( )[ ]1lnexp 211 −+= tττCππ ,t,tAtBt  for ( )1>t , where 
1C  is a constant, t,τ1  and t,τ 2  are time-dependent variables, and t,τ1  takes the value 
of only 1 or –1. Because ( ) 0
2
, 2
1
1,
Ctπ C tπ C dtinitial
−<
+−
 and ( ) C
tπ C dtinitial
πCt
,0
2
1,2
1
+−
<−−  
for sufficiently large ( )1>t  as shown in (Step 2) and the other initial differences have 
the same nature as C
ndtπ C dtinitial
π ++− 1,1,
, then 22 <t,τ  for sufficiently large ( )1>t . Here, let 
( ) ( )[ ]tzθθππ tPGAB lnexp60 −+=  for ( )0≥t . Then, ( ) ( )[ ]tzθθππ tPGAB lnexp60 −+=  
( ) ( )[ ]1lnexp6 21120 −+−+= tττCtθθπ t,t,PGA ; thus, =− 2tz ( )[ ]( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−+ 2211 6
1lnexp
1ln
tθθ
tττC
PG
t,t,  for 
( )1>t . Because 22 <t,τ  for sufficiently large ( )1>t , then 2lim =∞→ tt z .          ■ 
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Figure 1  Increases in the real obligation of tb when inflation is 
accelerating 
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Figure 2  Increases in the real obligation of tb , 1tb + , and 2tb +  when 
inflation is accelerating 
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Figure 3  Increases in the real obligation of ( )1s0b s,t1t ≤<+−  at time t when 
inflation is accelerating 
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Figure 4  Examples of inflation paths based on Model III  
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